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  Mojca Kuplen
Abstract
Contemporary discussions of the problem of ugliness in Kant’s
aesthetic theory have, to my knowledge, left unexplored the
relation of disgust to ugliness. At most, they have explained
away disgust as merely an extreme form of ugliness or
displeasure, as Guyer did in his interpretation of ugliness in
Kant’s aesthetic theory,[1] and by that strayed from the
phenomenological and conceptual uniqueness of disgust in
comparison to ugliness, while Kant, as I argue, did not. As a
matter of fact, careful investigation of the concept of disgust in
Kant’s writing will reveal the distinctive and multifaceted
character that he ascribed to this phenomenon. By examining
Kant’s treatment of disgust in comparison with more
comprehensive contemporary studies given by
phenomenologist Aurel Kolnai, psychologist Paul Rozin, and
the social study of William Ian Miller, I will address the ways in
which disgust can penetrate artistic representation without
subverting it and, more closely, interrogate the role of disgust
in contemporary art. Furthermore, within Kant’s aesthetic
framework, I will suggest a theoretical difference between
disgust and the concept of aesthetic ugliness.
Key Words
aesthetic appreciation, beauty, contemporary art, disgust,
Kant’s aesthetics, ugliness
1. The Concept of Disgust: An Overview of Kant’s
Treatment of Disgust in Comparison with Contemporary
Studies
Whereas Kant did not give any theoretical explanation of the
concept of disgust, he did nevertheless anticipate symptoms
that accompany it and that have been adopted in the
contemporary analysis as fundamental conditions of disgust.
Going beyond linking the phenomenon of disgust with oral
consumption, the idea of disgust in Kant’s analysis also
encompasses ethical conditions, and thus it is introduced as a
rather complex phenomenon.   Above all, he expounded the
concept of disgust by examining its aesthetic implications in
artistic representation. A brief exposition in §48 of the
Critique of Judgment reveals a rich insight into the nature of
disgust: “For in this singular sensation, which rests on mere
imagination, the object is represented as it were obtruding
itself for our enjoyment, while we strive against it with all our
might. And the artistic representation of the object is no
longer distinguished from the nature of the object itself in our
sensation, and thus it is impossible that it can be regarded as
beautiful.”[2] There are two particularly striking features that
must be stressed: (1) disgust’s imposing nature, and (2) the
anti-aesthetic effect resulting from it. Let me begin with the
first one.
The fact that the object of disgust has the ability to impose
upon us, especially through its visual representation, indicates
its indispensable relationship with sense experience. This is
taken later on, in contemporary examinations, as a condition
sine qua non of disgust, particularly its elemental relation with

the senses of taste and smell. In the Anthropology, Kant
characterizes disgust as a vital sensation connected
particularly with the “lower” senses of smell and taste.
Compared to the “higher” class of senses (touch, sight, and
hearing), smell and taste do not contribute to the cognition of
objects, but are more related with producing pleasure: “…the
idea obtained from them is more a representation of
enjoyment.”[3] That is, smell and taste are less responsible
for perceiving the surface of an object than they are pleasurerelated senses; that is, linked with the oral intake. Because
such intake is less free in the case of smell than in taste and
since we cannot choose entirely what will be taken in, the
aversion through smell is particularly forced on our enjoyment:
“For taking something in through smell (in the lungs) is even
more intimate than taking something in through the
absorptive vessels of mouth or throat.”[4] The intimacy of the
intake is conditioned by the fact that smell more directly
consumes the material feature of the object than taste does,
and thus provokes disgust more straightforwardly as a
defensive physiological reaction manifested through nausea or
vomiting. “Therefore it happens that nausea, an impulse to
free oneself of food through the shortest way out of the
esophagus (to vomit), has been allotted to the human being
as such a strong vital sensation.”[5] Disgust’s biological
relation to the sense of taste and smell, as well as its
dependence on direct sensory information about the object, is
well established here.
Paul Rozin refers to such food-related emotion as “core
disgust,” and defines it as “[r]evulsion at the prospect of (oral)
incorporation of an offensive object.”[6] The offensiveness of
an object, contrary to mere bad taste or sensory dislike,
intrinsically includes an idea of contamination. He makes a
considerable step forward by suggesting that it is not
necessary that the object of disgust is actually a contaminant,
but merely that the idea of it is sufficient to provoke disgust.
“Disgust is triggered not primarily by the sensory properties of
an object but by ideational concerns about what it is, or where
it has been.”[7] For disgust to be triggered, it is sufficient
that the object be associated, by means of other senses, with
the contaminant object; for example it is highly plausible that
we will avoid eating or even touching a chocolate in the form
of excrement.
Disgust, however, is not triggered merely through the senses
of taste and smell but also through visual perception. Kant, for
example, distinguished a type of disgust that concerns
violation of ethical, hygienic, and sexual appropriateness. He
writes, “An old woman is an object of disgust for both sexes
except when she is very clean and not [a] coquette.”[8]
Unfortunately, he does not offer any explanation of the nature
of such disgust. The most thorough attempt to define the
nature of visual disgust has been given by contemporary
writers. Paul Rozin defined such type of disgust as “animalreminder” disgust, which threatens particularly through visual
perception by reminding us of our animal origins. This
category of disgust includes violations of the body envelope
(amputations, injuries), sexual deviations, and hygienic
concerns, that is, deviations from well established standards of
cleanliness and purity in all three spheres. “We fear
recognizing our animality because we fear that, like animals,

we are mortal. We thus attempt to hide the animality of our
biological processes by defining specifically human ways to
perform them.”[9]
The phenomenological explanation of disgust given by Aurel
Kolnai alludes even more explicitly to the issue of mortality. He
interprets substances that evoke disgust as embodying the
idea of putrefaction, dissolution, decay, and rottenness, and as
being intrinsically related to the idea of transformation from
living into dead matter.[10] Accordingly, what is inherent in
the nature of disgust is the idea of life and vitality; an object
must first exist and live in order to be decomposed into death.
Only an object that evokes an idea of life can elicit disgust, a
life that is vanishing, decaying. For this reason, inorganic or
non-biological items are excluded from the subject of
disgust.[11]
The idea of an abundance of life and vitality inherent in disgust
is not an exceptional one. William Miller in The Anatomy of
Disgust interprets disgust as a reaction mechanism against a
surplus of unconscious and conscious pleasures. While the
first type functions as a blockade of unconscious desires, the
second one punishes the gluttony of it; it is “a time-activated
barrier that judges (usually too slowly) when enough has been
enough.”[12] Disgust originating from the excess or
overindulgence of pleasure and vitality was also emphasized
by Kant: “The disgusting is excess. Very sweet or fat.”[13]
Furthermore, it does not arise merely from oral consumption
but also from intellectual or mental enjoyment: “…there is
also a mental pleasure, which consists in the communication of
thoughts. But if it is forced on us (…) the mind finds it
repulsive (as in the constant repetition of would-be flashes of
wit or humor, whose sameness can be unwholesome to
us).”[14] Disgust, in this case, also functions as a defense
reaction; it serves as a protector from “drowning in
pleasure.”[15] In this “satiated disgust” the object does not
simply cease to be pleasant, but the accumulation of
enjoyment itself presupposes its own failing. “One cannot say
that what we have here is simply a pleasure that has ceased
to be pleasurable; rather, that the pleasure involved becomes
merely shallow, barren, reduced to a state where it is in
perceptible contrast with the will to life of the person.”[16]
Kolnai, who favors the explanation of disgust as inherent in
satiation, interprets excess of pleasure as a surplus of vitality,
an exaggeration of an aspect of life such as aggressiveness,
brutality, and sexuality, all of them “disorderly, unclean,
clammy, the unhealthy excess of life.”[17]
Common to all such interpretations is an understanding of
disgust as a product of cultural and social determination.
Beside animal-reminder disgust that has roots in social
preferences for distinguishing the rational side from the animal
one, psychological studies of “core” or food-related disgust
have shown that it is not so much a biological instinct against
contaminated objects but more a result of cultivation.
“Disgust may have some roots in evolution, but it is also
clearly a cultural product. Like language and sexuality, the
adult form of disgust varies by culture, and children must be
“trained-up” in the local rules and meaning.”[18] Kant
anticipated the necessity of cultural and social conditions for

disgust’s existence long before: “We also find that disgust at
filth is only present in cultivated nations; the uncultivated
nation has no qualms about filth.
Cleanliness demonstrates the greatest human cultivation, since
it is the least natural human quality, causing much exertion
and hardship.”[19] The idea that the boundaries of disgust
(what offends and what not) are culturally and socially
determined demarcates the displeasure of disgust from the
mere unpleasantness of sensations (distaste), and thus
defines it as a high cognitive emotion. Whether the object has
the quality of being disgusting is determined by the culturally
developed ideas of physical and moral contamination. Hence,
as Miller concludes, a feeling of disgust, even though highly
physiologically effective and visceral, is nevertheless an
emotion “connected to ideas, perceptions, and cognitions and
to the social and cultural context in which it makes sense to
have those feelings and ideas.”[20]
An explanation of disgust as originating from the decline of
vitality, life, and pleasure reveals its compelling and
ambivalent nature. In spite of the initial rejection of the object
of disgust, we are, on the other hand, attracted to it (there is
a special appeal in watching horror movies, peeking at
disgusting events such as car accidents, or visiting disgusting
art exhibitions). It is not merely curiosity or a peculiar
pleasure that we have in the transgression of standards but
the pleasure that is contained in disgust itself that allures us.
The phenomenon of fascination with disgust and its
celebration in mainstream art can thus be explained by
dissecting its very ambivalent character: desire and
displeasure. However, the latter moment must, in the end,
prevail in order to evoke repulsion in order to judge an object
as disgusting.   Disgust is after all a defense mechanism (in its
purest form indicated by nausea and a tendency to vomit)
against threatening (contaminated) objects. Although the
insinuation of fear does not have rational validity, it is
nevertheless inherently present in disgust. Fear of being
contaminated (defiled, dishonored) by the repulsive object
guides our rejection of it:   “…every feeling of disgust, without
necessarily including fear, yet alludes to it somehow.”[21]
But what exactly is being fearsome and, for that matter,
rejected? Not the fullness and vitality of life or pleasure which
is potent in the abhorrent object, but its decline. What is being
discarded, as Kolnai writes, is the surplus of life coming to the
end of its existence; either actual decline of living material
(decomposition of body or food) or the threatening collapse of
an escalating vitality (in mental or ethical disgust), “…as if
through the surplus of life that is here so pronounced we were
to become caught, as it were, in a short-circuit towards death,
as if this intensified and concentrated life should have arisen
out of an impatient longing for death, a desire to waste away,
to over-spend the energy of life, a macabre debauchery of
matter.”[22] Such an explanation of disgust as an integration
of disturbed pleasure and rejection captures its alluring nature
in many works of art.
2. The Nature of Visual Disgust and Its Anti-aesthetic
Behavior in Art
The primal origins of disgust are to be found in the senses of

smell, taste, and touch because, as pointed out, they grasp
the material essence of the object more fully; they are
properly to be regarded as the transmitters of contamination.
Nevertheless, seeing a flying cockroach or someone picking
their nose in public equally arouses aversion, despite the fact
that senses of smell, taste, and touch are not involved in such
a situation. Here we have a genuine example of visual
disgust, that is, disgust being evoked by the mere visual
appearance of the object. Even though there is no danger of
being contaminated by merely seeing a disgusting object, the
fear of being touched by it is still present, sometimes
intensified to the point of a physical reaction of nausea.
How does the idea of contamination sneak into visual cases?
One of the reasons, as Kolnai writes, is that the visual
sensation grasps the object more comprehensively and in its
more fully constituted way. It represents the object’s features
more clearly and thus it is capable of bringing up the
imaginative powers of other sensations.[23] To be repulsed
by the mere sight of an object is to be disgusted by it through
the associative thinking of how the object must be felt by
tasting, touching, or smelling it. Visual cases presuppose that
the imaginative working of the other senses is necessary. The
idea that the object of visual disgust is contaminated is then
brought in by linking it with other senses. Similarly, Miller
points out, “[S]ight works by suggesting the prospect of
unnerving touches, nauseating tastes, and foul odors or by
suggesting contaminating processes like putrefaction and
generation.”[24] It is not even necessary that the object that
visually evokes disgust have a bad taste or smell. Even
seeing a chocolate in the form of feces, although pleasing to
taste, is still highly repulsive. The reason for this is that the
mere visual form, by associative thinking of an object that is
contagious (feces), brings up the idea that this object is also
contagious, and thus elicits disgust. Similarly, an object can
look good, as, for example, a delicious looking steak, but if it is
made out of dog meat, it will nevertheless arouse disgust (in
some cultures). Such cases illustrate that visual disgust need
not be aroused by the way things look but by the fact of
knowing what the object is or what it represents.
The behavior of visual disgust in non-fictional situations is
comparable to its effect in fictional situations, such as in the
arts of painting, photography, cinematography, the plastic
arts, or performance art. As Carl Plantinga points out, the
difference is merely in the degree of disgusting feeling and not
in the type of emotion.[25] In fictional visual representation,
we still experience disgust as a unique defense reaction
manifested as nausea, turning away from the image or even
physically distancing oneself from it (as was the most common
reaction to the violent sexual scene in the movie, Irreversible
(2002), by Gaspar Noe.
What I am interested in here is the question of the validity of
Kant’s thesis about the anti-aesthetic behavior of disgust in
art; that is, whether an object that excites disgust by its visual
representation necessarily fails to be aesthetically appealing. I
will reexamine this question by considering three different
types of disgust, as distinguished by Paul Rozin, and their
behavior in the case of fictional visual representation.

Let us begin with the first one: “ ‘core’ disgust,” where
repulsion is provoked by the senses of smell and taste. In this
case, there is no necessary connection that an object that
excites disgust by the mere sense of smell and taste will also
excite disgust by its mere visual appearance. For example,
seeing chocolate made with cockroaches, while otherwise
orally disgusting, does not excite visual disgust. A similar case
can be found in Dieter Roth’s work, Shit Hare, a chocolate
Easter bunny made out of excrement. While taste-disgusting,
this fact alone does not alter its visually pleasing properties.
However, such orally disgusting objects can provoke visual
aversion in the case of seeing someone eating the object. Such
a reaction of visual disgust is suggested by Kant: “The sight
of other enjoying loathsome things (for example, when the
Tunguses suck out and gulp down the mucus from their
children’s nose) causes the witness to vomit, just as if such a
pleasure were forced on him.”[26] Visual disgust is here
evoked not by the object itself that is taste-disgusting but by
the image of someone consuming that object. This illustrates
a special power of transmittance between different types of
disgust, which Miller also pointed out: “We see the thing
chewed on and swallowed; we have, in other words, muscular
actions that can be sympathetically triggered by the
sight.”[27] Visual disgust is in this case evoked by the
suggestive imaginative powers of the sense of taste, but there
can be a similar transference between visual and tactile
disgust, for example, seeing someone touching a rat.[28]
Cinematography,in particular, has recognized this principle of
communication between oral and visual disgust, and thus
deliberately provokes them in horror and other intentionally
repulsive movies. Moreover, it uses this principle to
accentuate visual disgust by connecting “animal reminder” and
oral disgust. For example, in Pink Flamingos (1972) by John
Waters, the highlight of disgust is not when Crackers (Danny
Mills) and Cotton (Mary Vivian Pierce) slaughter and cut off the
ear of Cookie (Cookie Mueller) but when Divine eats it.
Similarly, in the movie Hannibal (2001) by Ridley Scott, the
most repellent scene is not when Hannibal (Anthony Hopkins)
opens Paul Krendler’s (Ray Liotta) skull and cuts out part of
his brain, but when he fries it in the pan and feeds Paul with
it. The violation of the body envelope heightens the emotion
of disgust when connected with oral consumption. This
demonstrates the intrinsic relation of disgust with the sense of
taste, and in general with the sense experience of an object.
There are two types of disgust that are, on the other hand,
more perplexing in their visual behavior: the animal reminder
and social moral disgust. Social moral disgust is, as Rozin
writes, aversion at the violation of the “spirit envelope” or
“human dignity in the social order.”[29]   For example, the
photograph of a crucifix submerged in a glass of the artist’s
urine, called Piss Christ, by the American artist Andres
Serrano, was proclaimed by many as an offending, abhorrent
work of art for the reason that it violates the purity and
holiness of Christian faith. Nevertheless, in spite of the moral
disgust that the object elicits, the aesthetic properties of it are
not altered by such disgust; moreover, the art work itself
remains extremely pleasing aesthetically. Moral disgust in
Serrano’s art work is not caused by the sight of the object nor

solely by the knowledge that it uses the artist’s urine, but by
the fact that a crucifix is placed in the urine: something that
is sacred is associated with a bodily excretion. Serrano’s art
work was not judged as morally repugnant because of its
aesthetic properties but because of its meaning, that is, the
message it conveys.
The notion of aesthetic properties I employ here refers to the
object’s formal properties, such as the perceptual structure of
the object’s elements, which, in a Kantian spirit, brings about
a self-sustaining activity of our cognitive powers (imagination
and understanding). Non-formal properties, such as the
knowledge that Serrano’s Piss Christ is submerged in urine
and not colored water, do not count as aesthetic properties.
For example, the aesthetic evaluation of Serrano’s art work
can remain unchanged even after gaining knowledge that it
was made using the artist’s urine. What does change,
however, is appreciation of Serrano’s Piss Christ as an art
work, which is not determined merely by its aesthetic value
but also by its other, non-aesthetic qualities, such as the
cognitive ideas it brings about, its originality, and so on.
Hence, although the knowledge of the material used does not
affect its aesthetic value, it does affect the interpretation and
judgment of it as an art work.
To conclude, even though Serrano’s art work may be morally
displeasing, this does not affect its aesthetic properties, since
the source of both feelings is different. An art work can be
judged by its moral message, but this does not necessarily
bring about its aesthetic devaluation. This is especially evident
in the opening scene of the movie Antichrist (2009) by Lars
Von Trier. In this rich and haunting sequence, it becomes
clear that a mother, while making love to a man, allows her
child to fall from a window. Despite the reaction of moral
revulsion at this act, this does not alter our ability to recognize
the striking beauty of the scene.
The aesthetic value of artistic representation is, however,
endangered more by the depiction of animal-reminder disgust,
which elicits repulsion most entirely through the sense of
sight. For example, depictions of disgust-provoking animals
(cockroaches, rats, maggots), decaying or mutilated bodies, or
perverse sexuality do not elicit disgust through the senses of
smell and taste, but through sight. What is more important,
aversion is not provoked by the way they look (by the
arrangement of visual properties) but how we look at them as
a violation of body envelope. The feeling of disgust, as
already pointed out, depends on what the object represents,
on the meaning hidden behind it.
Nevertheless, visual disgust is highly controversial in the realm
of art because it provokes the tension between the nature of
the disgusting object and its artistic representation, which can
easily collapse. When this happens, it is impossible to
aesthetically enjoy the depicted object. It is for this reason
that disgust implies aesthetic dysfunctionality. If the nature of
the represented object interferes with the artistic image, we
cannot distinguish artistic representations of that object from
the nature of that object itself. Thus disgust breaks the
aesthetic illusion or what Kant calls disinterested reflection,
which is necessary for the successful aesthetic representation

of an object. We can no longer distinguish between the
cognitive effect of the real existence of that object and its
mere representation; hence the aesthetic reflection is
destroyed.[30]
As already mentioned, even the mere visual representation of
the disgusting object is deeply experienced sensibly and it
evokes a feeling of nearness that, in the end, is responsible for
an aesthetic collapse and, consequently, the inability to find
the object aesthetically pleasurable. Such anti-aesthetic effect
of visual disgust is captured well by art works such as Sex and
Death, by Chapman Brothers, depicting the skull of the corpse
with a red clown nose covered by snails, maggots, spider,
snakes, and flies. The nature of the object as realistically
represented in the work obstructs any possibility of finding this
work aesthetically attractive. A similar anti-aesthetic eruption
of the portrayal of mutilated bodies, coprophagia, physical
violation, sexual degradation, urophilia, and humiliation of
moral dignity is evident in the infamous movie, The 120 of
Sodom, by Pier Pasolini. While some have judged it a
masterpiece because of the idea it embodies and its technical
aspects, the movie is visually hard to follow and is enjoyed
because of its abhorrent visual attributes.
What exactly is the disruptive factor that determinates the
negative aesthetic evaluation of such works? One reason lies
in the realistic manner with which the disgusting object is
presented: its nature is forced more strongly on the artistic
representation. This could explain why, for example, Frida
Kahlo’s painting, Las Dos Fridas (1939), does not disturb, in
spite of its use of animal-reminder disgust (violation of the
body envelope). It skillfully beautifies the object with colors,
lines, and shades so that disgusting depiction that remains is
merely a shadow. While the painting still represents a
discomforting subject matter, it is nevertheless a pleasurable
one. This explains further why depiction of disgusting objects
in photography provokes rejection more directly than in
painting. This is because the nature of the object is more
sensibly presented and thus more easily provokes our
imaginative powers, on which disgust depends.
However, such a technique of beautification is not the only
method of overcoming disgust for there are many examples of
art works of extraordinary beauty in spite of the vivid and
cruel depictions of repulsive objects. Slavenka Drakulić, in the
novel The Taste of a Man, describes an event in which the
protagonist murders, slaughters, and eats parts of the body of
her beloved man with such an explicit description that would in
ordinary cases provoke repulsion, yet in this case renders the
enjoyment beautiful. It is not merely the intelligent style with
which this episode is written that furthers the suspension of
the disgust’s anti-aesthetic effect but the context of the
depicted object. We are not confronted here with a mere body
violation for its own sake because of the protagonist’s mere
enjoyment in the brutality, but because this act embodies an
idea of spiritual sacrifice. Defiance of the body, which would in
an ordinary case excite disgust, as an animal reminder
reaction, is in this case associated with the idea of love. The
context of the disgusting object alters the feeling with which
we enter into it.[31]

Many art works illustrate that disgust’s anti-aesthetic effect
and our receptivity to those works can be suspended either by
stylistic control or by connecting the object with ideas. These
latter are contrary to the reminder of animality that marks the
object, and emphasizes rationality, love, moral and ethical
dignity, and humanity, thus imbuing the object with a more
profound meaning. This is one of the reasons, I argue, that
Kant insists on the importance of aesthetic ideas in art. The
influence of aesthetic ideas is not just in prolonging and
enhancing pure formal aesthetic pleasure, which has a
tendency to exhaust itself if not connected to rational ideas.
As an embodiment of the ideas of reason, the ideas have the
capacity to transubstantiate the displeasure of disgust into
aesthetic enjoyment.
An experience of disgust is a strong emotional reaction. Even
though the object is perceived only by sight, its strong
sensuous nature gives an impression of its nearness,
increasing the feeling of being threatened by it and making us
reject it. In general, the feeling of disgust is described as the
most visceral emotion of all, being essentially tied to sensory
experience. A disgusting object, even though perceived
merely visually, affects all our senses and, as Miller writes,
“invokes the sensory experience of what it feels like to be put
in danger by the disgusting, of what it feels like to be close to
it, to have to smell it, or touch it.”[32]
Because of this feeling of sensory nearness, disgust acts antiaesthetically. Since it prevents the possibility of distinguishing
between the nature of the object and its artistic
representation, it makes it impossible to perceive it in the
mode of disinterested reflection. This means that such an
object does not satisfy the condition of falling under reflective
evaluation at all, and thus cannot be possibly regarded as
beautiful. Nevertheless, the possibility of overcoming disgust
is intriguing for resolving the problem of so-called “abject art”
and the opportunity of appreciating it positively. The
disgusting, after all, is not a formal defect but by its very
nature contains something that captivates and fascinates.
What I am interested in here is the question of how the
embodiment of disgust in art works functions aesthetically.
Accordingly, two different types of the “incarnation” of disgust
can be distinguished: (1) art that manipulates the depiction of
the disgusting for its own sake, and (2) art works in which the
disgusting subject material is extrinsic to the purpose of art.
3. Disgust for Disgust’s Sake
The first type of disgust “incarnation” is apparent in
contemporary art and recognized by the name “abject art.” It
operates with strong realistic visual manifestations of the
disgusting objects, such as feces (Mike Kelley & Paul
McCarthy, Secession, 1998); a disturbing mixture of disgusting
substances, such as food, vomit, and blood (Cindy Sherman,
Untitled #175, 1978); sexually obscene uses of plastic body
parts juxtaposed distortedly (Cindy Sherman, Untitled #250,
1992); or mutilated and slaughtered bodies (Chapman
Brothers, Great Deeds Against The Dead, 1994). Manipulation
of such disgusting substances is an essential part of most of
these art works.

It is the nature of disgust itself that is being analyzed here.
For this reason, such art intentionally uses those art forms
through which the nature of the object can be more explicitly
presented, such as photography and plastic art. Its aim is to
decode the psychological, social, and cultural components of
disgust. In order to do this, it uses its own idiomatic style:
the more violent the experience of the subject matter, the
more the subject matter presses on artistic presentation, and
the more we are forced to deal with it. Contrary to Kant’s
principle of aesthetic deception (for the sake of aesthetic
appreciation), such art demands aesthetic breakdown. The
collapsing of the difference between reality and art is needed
in order to achieve the cognitive function at which such art
aims in order to bring art closer to every-day human
experience. And disgust, by its strong physiological and
sensual nature, can perform such collapsing especially
successfully.
It must be understood that such examples of art works do not
aim to be beautiful or aesthetically appealing, and they do not
require being such by their own definition. Their artistic
aspirations surpass the aesthetic ones, which is to grasp the
intellectual and experiential disclosure of disgust. The artist,
Jenny Saville, indicates the motivation of such art by saying, “I
don’t make paintings for people to say we should look at big
bodies again and say they are beautiful. I think that it’s more
that they are difficult. Why do we find bodies like this difficult
to look at?”[33] As Saville points out, the art of disgust
investigates the meaning of disgust and the existential,
philosophical, and social issues that are provoked by it.
Carolyn Korsmeyer writes that the most common issues that
the art of disgust interrogates are mortality, age, and
illness.[34] And Matthew Kieran puts forward the importance
of experiential knowledge that the art of disgust explores.
“Through engaging with such art works we may learn and
develop our cognitive understanding of what certain human
possibilities would or could be like.”[35]
For some of the art works this is true. For example, the
Chapman Brothers’ sculpture entitled DNA Zygotic (2003),
which depicts mutated children’s bodies, explores the issues of
genetic damage and forces us to reflect on its experiential
possibility. And the more the creation of disgust permeates
our sense experience, the more imperative becomes the
cognitive inquiry into its essence. This makes the art valuable
and, to some extent, enjoyable, although the enjoyment may
have merely cognitive rather than aesthetic value. Because
such art lacks positive aesthetic aspirations in the first place,
the representation of disgust does not destroy its artistic
function but completes it, and for this reason it can be a
successful artistic representation. Therefore, the art does not
contradict Kant’s fundamental principle of excluding disgusting
objects from the aesthetic realm, since such art does not aim
to be aesthetically pleasurable from the beginning. Hence, it
does not need to be preoccupied with the preservation of an
aesthetic illusion. This is, however, needed if the purpose of
art aims to elicit aesthetic pleasure, as Kant’s conception of
fine art suggests. It is challenging to reexamine not whether
the art of disgust is possible, since, as I have argued, it is, but
whether the aesthetic of disgust is achievable. That is, can
there be an aesthetically pleasurable representation of

disgusting subject matter?
4. The Possibility of a Positive Aesthetic of Disgust
There are many examples of art works with positive aesthetic
qualities in spite of their disgusting subject matter, such as
Frida Kahlo’s Without Hope (1945), depicting Frida lying ill in
the hospital bed and vomiting; Matthias Grϋnewald’s The Dead
Lovers (1528), depicting the bodies of a couple, riddled with
snakes, worms, and leeches; or Francisco Goya’s The Disaster
of War (1810), portraying brutally butchered bodies hanging
from a tree. How can the existence of an aesthetically
pleasurable representation of a disgusting object be consistent
with Kant’s thesis on the aesthetic dysfunctionality of disgust?
In order to resolve this problem, we must turn to Kant’s
argument.
What Kant argued in §48 is not that disgusting subject matter
ruins the aesthetic representation by itself, but it does so only
if the object is depicted in such a way that its repulsive nature
forces itself on the aesthetic enjoyment of the object and thus
threatens it. This happens when the nature of the object is
represented so that it activates our associative sensuous
experience of it (by the means of imagination), which results
in the rejection of the representation completely. Because
disgust is a strong visceral and physiological emotion, we are
unable, in such a depiction, to remain indifferent to, or
disinterested in, its artistic representation. In Kant’s words,
this means that we are unable to distinguish the nature of the
object from its formal representation and consequently to find
it aesthetically appealing. The depiction of disgusting subject
matter is aesthetically dysfunctional only if its nature is
represented in such a way that it destroys disinterested
reflection; that is, when our attention is not focused on the
imaginative representation of disgust but on its existence.
On the other hand, if the representation of the disgusting
object does not threaten its artistic image; that is, if we are
still able to retain distance to the nature of the object, the
aesthetic representation can remain successful. In this case,
we have a genuine situation in which the visceral reaction to
the disgusting object has been suspended. To remain in the
mode of disinterested reflection on the object is partly
conditioned by the type of the art form. For example, visual
and plastic arts are, in comparison to literary art, more
sensitive to such aesthetic collapsing, since they are more
inclined to represent an object with regard to its nature. This
is particularly true for plastic arts, and it is not without reason
that Kant suggested substituting any depiction of disgusting
material in the art of sculpture by its symbolic or allegoric
representations.[36]
In the visual arts, photography is again more inclined to
provoke aversion than painting is (for example, compare the
portrayal of a naked old female body in the painting by
Matthias Grϋnewald Death and the Age of Man (1540), and in
the photography by Andres Serrano: Budapest (1940), or the
depiction of butchered bodies in the painting of Francisco
Goya, The Disaster of War and as represented by the
sculpture made by Chapman Brothers, Great Deeds Against
The Dead). On the other hand, literary art has the most
power to manipulate the beautification of a disgusting topic.

This is because the representation of the disgusting object
through words is more distant from the appeal to our senses,
and hence we are more able to focus our reflection on the
formal portrayal of the subject matter. The more the artistic
representation of the disgusting matter is distant from the
nature of the object, the more its aesthetic appreciation can
be successful.
Properly speaking, there can be no positive aesthetic of
disgust, because, by definition, disgust contains a rejection of
the object before an aesthetic evaluation of it could even
begin. Disgust by its own logic contradicts aesthetic beauty
because it contravenes the fundamental condition of entering
into aesthetic apprehension: the principle of disinterestedness.
Aesthetic properties in general, as well as disgust, are related
to sensuous experience, yet disgust is an experience that,
contrary to pure aesthetic beauty (and ugliness), is essentially
connected to the cognitive ideas of contamination and
putrefaction. For this reason, disgust is more attached to the
material nature of the object and to what it represents than
with its formal configuration, as beauty and ugliness are. This
is evident from the phenomenological experience of disgust,
which is not a reflective experience but a visceral one; we feel
disgust with the entire body.
Even in visual representation, there is a feeling of physical
nearness with the aversive object. Thus, when we do find a
disgusting object aesthetically attractive, as in the case of
some works of art, it is because we do not have a genuine
disgust reaction but the displeasure of disgust in which the
original disgust reaction is suspended. What we have is a
deceptive or “pseudo-disgust” experience that is still painful,
yet without the sensuous impact that would destroy the
aesthetic illusion. I believe that such works of art, rather than
being named “disgusting beauties,” more properly deserve to
fall under the category of what Korsmeyer calls the
phenomenon of terrible beauties, “…beauty that is bound up
with the arousal of discomforting emotions.”[37]
5. The Phenomenological and Theoretical Demarcation
of the Concepts of Disgust and Ugliness
In the context of everyday discourse, there is a habitual use of
the words ‘disgust’ and ‘ugly’ when referring to objects of
displeasure, frequently interwoven with each other when
describing our dislike towards offending, incongruent, and
distorted objects. The concept of ugliness has a
predisposition, like disgust, to pervade moral evaluations and
disagreements, much more than its opposite, beauty, has.[38]
Leaving aside the semantic oddity of the concept of ugliness,
what I am interested in, in the context of this topic, is merely
its aesthetic function. That is, the use of the word ‘ugly’ as we
insistently employ it in purely aesthetic evaluations, is
reserved for the features of an object that do not fit together
(as, for example, hearing discordant musical tones or seeing
an arrhythmic dance performance or the image of an office
building beside a beautiful gothic church). The evaluative word
‘ugly,’ as used in these cases, refers to the judgment of formal
discord or disharmony among features of an object. It is thus
a mark of negative aesthetic judgment taken explicitly in the
Kantian understanding of aesthetic values.[39]

Disgust and ugliness have in common a dependence on a
negative feeling value, a feeling of displeasure. Furthermore,
this feeling is in both cases intentional. In the case of
ugliness, it is a conscious response to the formal arrangement
of qualities, that is, to its disharmonious display. In the case
of disgust, it is a conscious response to the idea of
putrefaction or contagiousness of the offending object, and,
hence, the feeling of displeasure in a repulsive object
necessarily alludes to the emotion of fear. There is, then, a
strict and apparent phenomenological difference between the
feelings of ugliness and disgust. While feelings of danger and
fear are essential for the emotion of disgust (which is, after
all, a defense reaction feeling), the displeasure of the ugly is
an effect of a mere dissatisfaction with the disagreement
between formal qualities in which any kind of reference to
ideas or concepts is excluded. In order to find an object’s
features discordant, there is no need to know what the object
is about (leaving aside Kant’s category of dependent aesthetic
properties). What matters is merely its formal appearance as
it affects our aesthetical common sense.[40]
Furthermore, both disgust and ugliness have their own
phenomenological feeling tonalities of displeasure. An object
can be more or less aesthetically ugly, depending on the level
of discord between formal qualities. Likewise, an object can
more or less evoke disgust, depending on how strongly the
idea of putrefaction pervades it. We are usually less disgusted
at the sight of filth[41] than at an injured body, although it
also depends on the individual sensitivity for the
disgusting.[42] That the concepts of disgust and ugliness
have different sources is evident more clearly from the fact
that we can find some objects strongly repulsive, without a
trace of any pure aesthetic ugliness (for example, snakes can
be quite repulsive animals for many of us, though in some
cases they can exhibit high aesthetic beauty in the
arrangement of their colors, such as coral and corn snakes).
Also, the opposite is the case. There can be aesthetic ugliness
for example in listening to a concert, where players
consistently play the wrong notes, yet without any kind of
trace of disgust. As a matter of fact, dance and music (such
as instrumental music) are the only art forms in which disgust
does not feature. The reason why the arts of dance and of
pure music cannot be disgusting is because they are merely a
perception of pure formal qualities; the play of bodily
movement in space in the first place, and play of sound in time
in the latter.[43] Disgust can be found only in the art forms
that are not merely expressions of pure formal qualities but
where content is explicitly involved.
This observation reinforces the argument for the dissimilarity
of disgust and aesthetic ugliness. While ugliness refers
exclusively to the composition of pure formal properties of the
object, disgust refers to the meaning of the depicted, the idea
that the object represents or embodies. Moreover, the fact
that disgust can be found merely in organic and biological
items (or in items associated with them), while ugliness is not
limited in this way, supports the view of their different natures.
Disgust is inherent in the idea of putrefaction (because only
living things are destined to die), while ugliness is in the
formal configuration of an object.

The conceptual demarcation of disgust and ugliness can be
reinforced by Kant’s appeal to the different cognitive faculties
that disgust and ugliness employ. As he writes in §48, disgust
depends on nothing else but the imagination of the senses,
while aesthetic feelings of beauty and ugliness are partly
intellectualized feelings. The aesthetic perception of ugliness
and beauty is a reflective perception. It employs a mental
state of free harmony (or disharmony) between the faculty of
imagination and the faculty of understanding. After all,
according to Kant, aesthetic pleasure (or displeasure) demands
universal validity, and it could not do that if not linked with the
understanding, which is thus indispensable for aesthetic
perception. Aesthetic feeling is the feeling of a free
harmonious (or disharmonious) play between imagination and
understanding; this is the fundamental structure of its
aesthetic purity and universal validity, which is lacking in
disgust. In the light of these considerations, it is legitimate to
argue that disgust and ugliness, although both negative
evaluative judgments, are dissimilar in the most fundamental
phenomenological and theoretical aspects. The feeling of
ugliness is an effect of a reflective mental state in which the
faculty of understanding is necessarily employed, whereas
disgust belongs to the special domain of sensory
experience.[44]
Nevertheless, as Kant writes, the disgusting can be a mark of
aesthetic displeasure, and, hence, its jurisdiction reaches
aesthetic territory also. In this context, disgust and ugliness
both characterize an aesthetic failure, though their approach
differs significantly. While ugliness, understood as pure formal
disorderliness, is a mark of so-called “inner” reflective failure,
which is discernible by a universal aesthetic dissatisfaction as
an effect of interference between the play of imagination and
understanding, disgust is properly a mark of a so-called
“outer” aesthetic failure. An object that is disgusting simply
influences aesthetic appreciation from a non-aesthetic realm.
The content prevents the possibility that an aesthetic
reflection even enters into our perception of the object. It
does that by hindering the possibility of a disinterested
attitude to the object in the first place. To disinterestedly
regard the object means, in other words, to subsume it under
the aesthetic apprehension that determines whether the object
is beautiful or not (depending on the harmony or disharmony
of aesthetic qualities through the feeling of pleasure or
displeasure). And if disgust prevents the possibility of an
object to be evaluated aesthetically in the first place, that is, if
the object cannot be aesthetically evaluated at all, then a
fortiori it cannot be evaluated positively, that is, as beautiful.
It is for this reason that disgust functions anti-aesthetically,
because it interferes with the aesthetic process “from the
outside”, that is, from the meaning of the depicted.
The feeling of ugliness, on the other hand, does not interfere
with aesthetic reflection as disgust does but, on the contrary,
is an outcome of aesthetic apprehension. To evaluate objects
as aesthetically ugly is to acknowledge that the reflective
operation took place and that its outcome was a negative
aesthetic feeling of ugliness (aesthetic displeasure), which
therefore must be regarded as a counterpart to beauty, more
than disgust is. An object that is aesthetically evaluated as
ugly can, by definition, never be regarded as beautiful, while

an object of disgust can exhibit, on certain occasions (when
the aesthetic illusion between the nature of the object and its
representation does not collapse) aesthetic beauty.
Both ugliness and disgust are aesthetic counterparts to beauty
and to aesthetic success. While ugliness as a negative
aesthetic partner of beauty is its proper opponent, disgust, on
the other hand, is much more resistant to beauty than
ugliness is. Kant nevertheless writes that there can be a
beautiful portrayal of an ugly object, but not of a disgusting
one.[45] Disgust is the most hostile opposition to beauty, not
because disgust would be the most extreme form of ugliness,
but precisely because of its different nature. Disgust is a sign
of an immediate failure. In contrast to ugliness, disgust fails
without aesthetic examination. It is a symptom of failure
before even entering into aesthetic reflection, just as a feceslike chocolate fails to be appreciated before even tasted and
sensibly evaluated. Disgust is the enemy of beauty precisely
because it prevents any aesthetic evaluation. It is a turn-off
without even being aesthetically inspected.
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